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Sp~ce  Sl~t~ttle rend~.z~ous missinnr presented unique chnllengcs t l ;~ t  were no1 fuUy recogniad wghell the Shuttle 
*UP designed. Rcndezvous (nrpcts could br! pnssive (i.t., no lighb nr trnnsponders), and tiot dcsignd to 
facilitate Shuttle rtndezvous, pruxlnlity operutions and rclrieval. Shuttle rcvctlon control system jct plume 
implagernent on target spacacmh preuenrcd l~lduced dynamlcs, structural loading and tont~mlnation 
conccrnt. These lhxues, nlong with Ilii:!teb f o ~ a r d  reection wntro! system prupcllvnt, drove n change irnm ihc 
Gcmlnl~Apollo cuuUlptlc profile hcrltage tn a stnble orbit proflle, and the development of new proxfmily 
opcrndons techniques, M111tipIe rclei~tllic and on-orblt servlclng tnlssionx; and crew exchangu, nssembly nnd 
rcplcnlshment i l l ~ h a  to Mir r?nd to the Inlurnational Spaw Station drove further profllt end pilnting 
iccltnlque changw, ir~cluding new rclatlve naviptlon sensors and new computcr guleraced piloting cues. 
Nom'encfsture the issucs with Shuale mdezvous snd proximity operations had been 
fUlly identified and reeolved, which in turn resulted ia complcx 
H B~~ = a\ong the mge t  momentum opmn~ionnl work- around^. kopertlfs for \ohtc:e c~~ipabilitim 
vcctor competed for funding based on availnble budget, available schedule, 
ix = LVLH i-X %is vcctor snd criticality to safcty and mission succecs. Technical chdlengcs in 
- 
= LVLH +Y axis vcctor building a reusabic oribirai spacecraft, such as propu16ioti, & e i G  5 
= LVLH -1.Z axis vector protetion, smctures 6nd weight control, t30k priority over thc 
'2 
kft. = kilo-feet dcvclopmart of other system& and flight techniques that presented (or 
M-C = Mid-course Correction mancuvcr wcrc tusun\ed to prcscnt) l s s  rechniwl risk, such as rendezvous, duc 
MCC = Mid-Counc Correction maneuver. in p n ~ t  to thc success of Gemini ~d Apcl)~.  
min. = ~ninutcs Many papers have been pubiisined on theorcucai aspects of 
n. m. = nautical m i l s  rcndcflous, with -1ittk mention of real-world constraints and 
NC = phesing manctlvcr challenges othcr than. trnjectoxy oprimization. While some papers 
NCC = Correctivc.Cornbination mancu~er  have focuscd. on certain tcchnicnl u p e c a  of Shuttle rendenroutl, the 
h3I = Height mantuvtr progntmmdc constraints and technical challenges encountered 
NPC =Plane Change maneuver during tarly ShuItle mission analysis in h e  1970s havc not been 
NSR = Slow Ratc (co-elliptic) rnancuvx adequately detailed in thc literature. An understanding of how 
'T = rarget posilion vector programmalie nnd technical chnllenges shaped vehicle opcrntion and 
R Bar = ~ulit vcctor pointed from targct to..tl:lle centn of the Earth mission design is essential for flying safc and successful missions, 
Ti = Transition initintion maneuver and f01 mitigating cost, schedulc nnd teclmicel risk in h turc  
TPX = T m i n a l  Phase Initiation maneuver progran~s.' 
A = Tcrminnl Yhasc Mid-cou~re mancuvcr 
v~ = target velocity vector 11, Historical ~ack~roun'd  - Mercury, Gemini,'Apollo 
V Bar = unir vector of cross product of brget orbit~l  angular 
morncnturn and targct position vectors In  rhe late i9SOs research into spacecrsit rcnuezvous b e c ~ n e  s
AH = hcight differeutial bctwten cllaser s n a  tsrget spacecraft popular topic in ncodemic, induttry, rind government circles?.' 
A V  = delta velociy Studies of man'ual and automatic rendcwoue conducted by the 
NASA Langley Research Ccncer wai a key factor behind 
1. Introduction dtvelop~nent and acceptance of the Lunar Orbit Rendemow mission 
profile for   pol lo.^-" 
At the end of the Apollo era, rcndemous principles Were.wclI On-ohit vioving of deployed objects and sffobes was =valuated 
understood, but cxtnnsive adaptation of proven rendezvous principles during smcral M e r c q  flights to determine Be  ability of thc human 
and new technique iievelopment was required to meer new Shuttle eye to s u p p o ~  r n a ~ r u ~ l  pi oting,7 
r e n d e z v o ~ f p r ~ x i m i ~  opmbons reqlliremcnk, OVercomc emerging In 1962 some Langlty rendezvo~u ypecialists moved with thc 
Shuttle d c s i ~  liniirations and surmount programmatic chaUenges. Spacc T& Group io the newly formed Manned Spsccmaf; C a t e r  
Shuttle dev~lopment we5 subjected 10 close scrutiny ~ O T  budget and @fSC) in Houston. NASA and contractor personnel from variom 
schedult cornplialcc. Vehicle design was baselined bcfoore many of &scipJines at MSC, and die MSC Misgion Plsnning and Analysis 
Division in particular, turned rendezvous thebry into reality during 
Copyright 0 2005 by United Spscc Alliance, LLC. Published by the the G.e~nilli Prog~D1.a The Gmini  flights established an experience 
Amcrjcan htsrirulc of Acionaudcs and Actroo~utics wih  peonission. These bwe mission and L.ccution in prcpafOtion far 
marcrials 'nrt  spot~sorcd by tlre National Aeronautics and Space sdefy-criticsl ~ ~ ~ , l ~  ( ~ ~ b l ~  ~ ) . P . I S  me Admihismdon under ContactNAS9-2000Q. Thc U.S. Govcrnmcnt retains a ptrspecn'vc of nsnonaut E3 panicu)3rly paid-up, nonexclusivc, irreuoc&lc worldwide liocnsc in such lnetcrials to 
reproduce, repar dc"vativc dist6butc hc public, and instmn~etitsl in Lhe dev~lopmcnt of manual piloting and contingency 
perfonn puhlicly and display publicly, hy or on bcllalf of the U.S. rcndczvOus tedmiqucs.'d 
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Tnble 1 Gernlnl Rendernous Accomplishments 
- Cocllip(ic rcnd~rvou~ &on1 above and bdow 
Sfablt orbit, direct ascent and qua1 period (footbnll) 
~~endezvous 
Rendezvous during both orbital night nnd day 
Use of only optical incasurcmcn& (no mdur) 
- Station-keeping and docking 
- Simulbncouo countdown of dleser snd targct launch 
vehiclcs 
hunch during a narrow launch windou, 
Kcal Lime maneuver rsrge&~g using dam From p u n d  
bascd or onboard nzvigntion sensors 
Conduc~ing multiple rcndcmous operations in a 
singlc mission wilhin a propellent budget 
landing. Tbesc missions, coupled with the success of Apollos 11 and 
12, lad to thc dtvtlopment of a shortcr rcndnvous profile thar was 
f lom on Apollos 14 through 17 to incrcasc luntit surface stay tirne.I7 
Complex contingency rcndnvous procedurek 10 be flown by cithcr 
clte Com~nsndiScrvicc Module or Lunar Module wcrc dcvcloped and 
continuously refincd during the Apotlo Program, bur were never 
flown doe to nominal spacecraft pcrformancc. Apollo hardwaxe, 
sofiwan and rendezvous trajectory tcchniqucs were later adapted to 
support rendezvous and docking with Skyiab and SO~U.~"."~ 
111. A New Direction In Missinn Activities 
Spam Shuttle rendezvou and proximity opentions rcprcscnted a 
significant drparrure from Ganini and   pol lo.^ Most rendtzvou 
targets would not possess activc navigation aids (rmnsponders or 
lights), nor wcrc mnny of them origi~~ally designcd to suppoTt 
mdemous, rehitvat and on-orbit senicing. Shuttlc r t n d e t v o ~  
missions tile0 involved deploy and rchicval of the same or different 
spacccraft 01) the same missian, and on some missions more than one 
rcndczvou.. 
Rclativc chnser and terget sp~cc?crafi sizc were ~ignifrcmtly 
diffacn t. Previous c h a w  vchiclcs (Gemini, Apollo 
CommandiScrvice Module (CSM) and Lunsr Modult (LM)) were 
about thc snme size as the targct spacccraft (Gemini 7, Agena, 
Augmeaced Targct Dodcing Adapter, I&, SoF) or snlaller (Saturn 
S-TV13, Skylab), Unit1 the Mir and Intemationsi Spacc Station (ISS) 
missions, the orbiter was much lsrgerthan its rmdczvous urgers. 
Rather than docking at -1 foot'sccond, ns wns done in Gemini 
md Apollo, satellite rctricvals involvrd ctipturc nnd berthing with. a 
robotic ann (thc Rcrnotc Manipulator System, 01. RMS), with nearly 
zero relative velocities bctwccn the two wacecrafi Robotic arm 
opcratims, cnptute and berthing had not bccn performed on previous 
programs. R.MS design requirerncnts wcrc B function of orbiter 
stopping distance, arm joint losds and thc ability of the crew to detecr 
and control relative rates. 
Shunle docking with Mir and ISS required a contacc velocity an 
ordet of ~mgnihrdt louer than Gemini and Apollo, with tighter 
piloriag toluanccs on time of docking and contact vciocity. Gemini 
nnd ~ ~ o l l d  docking wcrc axial, along thc crcw line-of-sighr and in 
direct. view of the crew. Shuttle grappling and docking required h e  
usc of cameras to provide adcquatc crcw visibility nnd cues far find 
connol. Since target spaoccraft could po~sibly already be m orbit 
durjng mission pla~mi-ng, some grapple equipment used by thc 
Shuttle Program wx designcd from docurnentarion of target 
spacecraft hatdwnre, and ura not matcd on the ground for prdight 
checks as was done for Geinini and Apollo docking hardware. 
IS'. Early Rendezvous Study 
In 1969, a study of on-orbit AV budgeting was conducted for rhe 
.A,dvnnced Logistics System (ALS), an early name for the Space 
Shuttle. A five-maneuua coelliptic profile was propoeed for a 
resupply mission to a space station in 200 or 270 n.m. circular orbits, 
with sn inclination of 55 desecs. Tht study assumed a launch 
directly inro the orbital planc of the station, a dally launch window, a 
minimum phasing perigcc of I00 n.m., rendezvous within 24 hour8 of 
launch, and dcorbit within 24 hours of dep- from the station. 
Apollo and Gcmini flight rechniques, scnsor chwacreristics, and flight 
expcricnn was factored into tile propellant budgeting estimate. The 
ALS tcrminai phese was rne .same as that used on most Gemi~ri and 
  pol lo missions (Fig. The study showcd thnt propellant 
required could be significantly reduced if the rcquircments for every 
tiny launch, rendezvous duration and minimum perigcc wcn rtiexed. 
h - AV along the line-of-sight I 
to the taqet a!+ 
Eiewtfoi; angte cue 
Mld-Course 
r-A-.e...fl..-,. TPI Coelliptlc Ttajectory 
. +"I, OCIIYI  I* 
* 
Fig. Z Terminal Phase lor coelliptlc rendezvous. See 
Appendix for coordinate frame description. 
Low inertlal line-of-sight rate during final 
braking and appmsch . a 
L( Target vlewed egalnst star beckground V Bar 
V, Shuttle Design Reference Missions 
I A 
12uring the Shuttlc Phasc' B srudjcs (1970-1971), the followmg 
assumptions were madc: 1) rend:zyous techniques and pnnciplcs 
were well understood, snd the flight regime should not contain 
technical challcngcs; 2) the coellipric termiual phasc &on Gemini wd 
Apollo will bc wed; 3) a rrnrget inounted navigation transponder will 
ttllow Rncking our to the maximum rwnnge achieved during tho Apollo 
Progtnm (-300 n.m.); 4) radar skin sacking of a passive targct out to 
10 n.m was a condngency mooe of operation; 5) thc Shunle will be 
capablc of nutanomour rendezvous; and 6) on-board computer 
capacity will be significantly grmtcr than Apol)o, 
By 1973, four Shunle referentxi missions wcre in use %r mission 
planning, vchiclc sizing and subsystem requirmcn?~ defini~ion, atla 
three of thcm involved r e o d e ; r v o ~ . ~ ~  Thcrc was 4 9 0  e requ'iren~ent 
(later wavcd) for 8. Shunle to rescue the crcw of another: Shuttle 
.stranded in orbit. Rcecue was to occur no later than 96 hours after 
launch of tlg rescue vehicle. Thc rcscuc Shunle was to be abic to 
phast from tirher above or bclow'thc orher Shunle's orbit, depending 
on the initial phasing at launch. 
Rendezvous For Reference Missions 1 and 2 
The Mission I design iavolvcd a Shuttle deploycd spacc tug 
returning a geosynchronous satellite to an orbit coelliptic (AH of 10 
n.nl) with the Shuttle, to faci1ita.t~ retrieval. 7he Shuttle would then 
paform a TPI maneuver and fly R terminal phase similar to Gemini 
and Apollo (Fig. 1). Mission 2 was a sewicing nlission to an orbiting 
.science platfom. 
In April of 1973, the fivemaneuvcr profile used for Mission 2 
W X ~  ieplaccd by a Skylnb b ~ s c d  profile that satisfitd Shutlle 
opcrstional considuations that hnd bwn idendficd up to that tilllc. 
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'niosc considerations were: 1) rendavous with a navigationally 
activc or passive target a t  orbital dtimdcs ranghg from 150 10 400 
n.m.; 2) liftoff dme selected whenever coplanar launch is possible, 
and will iiot bc constrained by timeof-day; 3) minimize onboar6 
relativc nnvig&tion sensor cost, operating rangc and accuracy; 4) 
ground trecking support requirements had not been clearly dcfincd; 
5) an optical sensor was required for incrtiril platform alignment; and 
6) the phnsing potion of the rendezvous was nor to bc unnecessarily 
large. 
A change to the Skylab plan iinvolvcd Ihc insertion of a second 
coclliptic segment bcforc the NCC bum pig. 2). This yccond 
V Bar 
I 
f - Optlcel Tracking OMS-1 
Radar tracking occurs after TPI. 
Pip. 2 Dual co-elliptic rendclnous (1973-1983). 
V Bar (n, rn.) 
+I I -2 -4 -6 
f I AK' I I I I+ / / ' Stallon keeping (r33.8 rnin.) i f  First braking gate (+ -26 rnln.) 
Begln terminal control 
i 
-
Acquire radar data 
L (+I 8 rnin.) 
m 
rzt 
a '6 ~ t s r i  TO)! maneuvar, 
open payload bey 
End of \ 
+I0 - Insartion burn 2 
(*I2 min.) 
Pig. 3 Mlsslon 3B approach (1975). Times we 
with respect to liftoff. 
coclliptic phase allowcd the subsequent mKneuver points to be 
chosen ro mixximizc usc of reflected sunlight for opticd tracking of 
navigationally passive targcts. The additional cocllipric segmcnt also 
cnsured the same rclativc geometry hom rhc st& of optical tracking 
through intercspt for varintions in lifioff time and tsrgct orbital 
al ti tude. 
Relatively constalir rangc 8t the firsr optical trscking opportunity 
was also important duc to thc lower quality of op~icnl tra&<ng at his  
point. The dual coelliptic sequence. (AH of 20 qnd 10 n.m.) also 
provided enough connol over .lighting to minimize iightiug 
considerations for launch window dckrmination. A widc vnriotion in 
liftoff time was permitted without resulting in sn m;ceusively long 
phuingperiod. Thc profile nlso p&ttcd flexibility in sclccting the 
lcveI of ground tracking required and, in rhe selection of on-bonrd 
rclative navigation sensors. 
The standard tcrminal phase (Fig. I )  was also used for Mission 2. 
One issue, however, was dlat thc targets would probably not possess 
snobes, a s  othw tugets had in previous propms. Lighting 
rcquimenti far the pro-T?I opticd tracking p s s  md thc inititition 
of! manual piloting (8. few thousand fcct from the targct) nt sunrise 
drove TPI to bc puformed after sum& A lnck of targct artidcia1 
lighting rncant thrtt the backup manwl procedure of pointing thc 
vchicle rhrust ax& a1 the targd to txccute TPI would not be 
a~ailable, x it was onmany rrajectorics flown by Gemini nnd Apollo 
vehicles. The dual coclliptic (Fig. 2) wo~tld seive as thc baseline 
Shuttle profile for mission planning until April of 1983. 
Rendezvous For Reference Mission 3B 
Mission 3B was a stiteltire retricvai gorn a 100 n.m, cir&- 
orbiS with launch iind Innding owwring at Vandcnbmg .Ur Forcc 
Bnse. Mission duration was abou~ 2 hours. 
'I'hc insenion point (Fig. 3) wes choscn to place the Shunle on n 
terrninai trajectory with chnrrtcteristics similar to thosc uoed on 
tcrrninal approaches flown 011 Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and Apollo- 
Soyuz missions (Fig. 1). 
Due to the sllort timcline (station-kccping at a range of 100 feet 
established -21.6 rninutcs s5a orbit insertion), no ground tracking 
of ?he ShuLtle was to bc performed, nor would tlic Shuttle have 
proccsscd relarive scnsor mensuremcnts in .E Kalman filter. No on- 
board targeted msnewcrs u~ould lmvc b e n  pe~forn~cd. Radar dab 
(mngc, range rate, incrtisl lineof-sight rates) was 10 have been used 
by the crew to fly an approach along a shejyht line relativc to sn 
inertial reference kame and reduce closing vcloci~y to approprialc 
Ievcls. While similar profilcs hod been f l own  on Oemini 11 and 
  pol lo Iuns  missions 14 through 17, the Mission 30 profile was 
i?iiich more d~rnmding. XL'Etrher ~r nct rrndcnous. hrgpf capbrc 
with the RMS, bathing, payload bay door closure and deorbit could 
have been accomplished within the tinldinr iu questionablc. 
Missions 38  and 3A (6 similnr mission, but with a deployment 
rathcr than retrieval) wcrc the most challenging o f  the rcfcrcncc 
missions, and had the most impact on Shuttle systems dcsign and 
performance rcquircmen~. Planning for both nGssions rndcd around 
1376, and neithu was flown. 
VI. Plume Impingement 
Identification of the Problem 
Gemini and Apollo attitude canrrol systems produced little cross 
coupling. nnd thrust magnitudt, uozzlc cantin& target vchiclc sire 
2nd ap.mdegcs &~d not resuit in significtmr plume fmpingmeur 
issues. Lunar Module self-impingement did havc lo be eddresscd 
with hardwtlre modifications. In the early 19709, the existcncc of 
plumc impingement was coiltroversial, b\;t ziidysis af Gemini 11 
film showing tether dynamics ia response to RCS firings provrd rhnt 
plume impingement was real. During the first atttmpt on Skylab 2 10 
deploy a sbck solar may ,  thc CSM was maneuvered so rhat u 
crewman standing in the hatch could reach the array with n 
deployment tool. Apollo CSM thrusting to null thc closing velocity 
triggered Skylab jet firings to maintain attitude, whrch resultcd In an 
opening retc berateen the vch.iclc~.'~ L tc r  film of Apollo CSM RCS 
effccts on the Skylab thermal control parasol niggercd Ruscian 
concerns about plumc impingement for tht Apollo-Soya missron. 
Four of the CSM's RCS jets were Inhibited within 2 seconds of 
contact, to avoid plume loading on the Soyuz solar arrays.'* 
9 y  1973, c~ntamination of payloah. by Shuale RCS jct effluents 
during the Shutrle approach and braking phase was a concern to thc 
payload cornrnuniry. Previous analysis focused on potential 
conhminatlon in the payload b y  at thc I~unch site and on-otbir. Ac 
approach tmjectory was proposed that minimized the expulsion of 
combustion by-products er thc taTger, and rhcrcfore minimized the 
pownrial for conramination (Fig. 4). Thc trajectory w a ~  designcd 
u~2der the nsswlption that the targct spacecrafi could nor be dcsiped 
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impingement 
+R Bar 
station 
keeping\ /\ 
Pig. 4 Terminal approach to mlnlmPze plumc 
impingement on target (1973). 
'\ 
\\ 
with fcaturcs to prevent contami?~ation (such as movable sensor 
covers), or &at control of target artitude could not prcvcnt 
contamination. A target spccific minimum rnnge at which jets could 
be fired ilr the direction of the targct without a corltnniination concern 
was defined. AC this point thc orbitcr would tra~~sirion from the direct 
approach trajectory to a station-kccping point on rhe target velocity 
vector (V Bar, see Fig. 26 in Appendix). AAer preparations for 
; 
"11 ~ m @  
I r.-. 
was nOT factored into the d c s i g ~ i . ~ ~  
By May of 1976, plumc impingunent simulations using simple 
math modr)s had bccn conducted. Results indicrrtcd that plume 
impingement induced dynamics at RMS rclcasc or grapple ranges 
could make LDEF dcp1oyme-m and tehievsl dificult and perhaps 
impossihlc, A dcvclopnient effbn was inlbated to obtain improved 
models of Shuttle RCS jcts and plume physics. New modcls were 
required to bencr chnractcrize impingement effects and tcst 
trajectories, piloting techniqucs, new software, and identify vthiclc 
htlldwar~ modifications needed to mitigatc impingement effectr. 
gbpple with k c  F M S  WEE, comp!e?e, 2!e crbirer WCG]!!,~ j~?j!lzte th,c Fig. h Atret??pled retriev.! of the Sa!zr 
final approach lo thc target. satellite by an astronaut flying a Manned 
In 1975, work began on rcndczvous procedures for the Long Maneuvering Untt on STS-4IC. 
Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF, Fig. 5) rehim1 and Solar 
Resolving the Plume Impfngctne~rt and 
Porwtird RCS Propellant Problems 
By April of 1977, &cr a considcrablc amount of lobbying by 
concerned technical and msnagmont personnel, potential problems 
with rile ability of the Space Shuttlc to rctricvc satellites sucli as 
LDkT and Solar Max were receiving visibility at high levels within 
the Shuttle Progr~m and Ibe pryloadr community cxtanal to the 
Prograin. 
Some proposed so1ut;ons to the plume impingcmcnt problcnl, 
such as alternate recovery techniques using new hardware (stand-off 
berthing using s mast or tcther), a payload bay mounted mld-gas 
propuls~on system, and "hnrdencd" p~ykads  wcrc not acceptable due 
to conlplexity and co~t .  Opcrn~ional work-aroundu consisting of ncw 
piloring techniques, end Shnnle ?light centre1 system modifications 
wcrc prcfcrred. However, these options increased propellant ugugr 
and increased comp)exity of crew nrocedures and Shunle flinht 
- - w 
Fig. 5 LDEF being maneuvered with the RMS. contiol software. 
Maximum Mission sarcllitc s c ~ c i n g  p i g  6), due to an anticipated 
dcploymcnt of LDEF on an early Shuttle mission, and the 
approaching launch of Solar a x  on s Delta booster. Issues arising 
out of hcsc efforts wcrc lo havc a profound impact on Shuttle 
operntionnl concepr's. The ]urge sire of the Shutllc p r i m q  RCS jeb 
($70 pound< thruxt) coupled with the small size of JDEF and Soltir 
Max compared ro the Shunle led to more concerns about RCS plume 
iu~pingement effects. Plume impingement could induce finitude rates 
on the targct or cven result in separation of the target and Shuttle. 
Targets wit11 attitude control systems may not have been designed to 
Both the Gemini and Apollo vehicles cnrried ample propellant 
margins, but the Shuttle was limited in t m s  of forward RCS 
propellrult. The Shuttle could run out of forward RCS propellant 
during t h ~  terminal phase (Fig 1) under dispersed trajectory 
conditions, and in thc c v a t  of a radar failurc. 
At this time the lerm "proximity operalions" or "prox ops" w s  
coined, and proximity operations becamt a dietinct discipline within 
the Shuttle Program. Proximity operarions occur close to the targct 
(within 2,000 feet), and are characterized by ncsrly continuous 
trajectory control, whcrcas rendcnlous control mweuveis typicnlly 
occur st intervals of hoius or tcns of minutcs. 
maintain attitudc in tbc prcscncc of orbitcr plumcs. ~ h i s ~ w a s  a From fuly ro Scpcember of 1977, a study o f  apprpoch and ststion- 
panicular concern for payloads that used gravity gradient kccping ttchniquts Waf conducted in the l'ohnson Space Center (JSC) 
scabiliznrion, such ns LDEF. Shuttle thruster sizing, placcmcnt snd Systems Engineering Sinluiator. This was thc first. six dcgrcr-of- 
orientation were designed to provide adequate flight conhol aufhority Creedom simulstor ro incorporate plumc cffccts. V Bar, R Bar rind FT 
throughout the Shuttlc flight cnvclopc, and to avoid self-impingement Bar approa.chcs aid ststion-heping were evaluated m g .  7).  Kcsults 
of aeTo siL&ces, but impingcmcnt of t q e r  spacecraft or me a45 - coniirmcd etulicr s~udies, which indicated t h ~ t  an Apollo incfljnl 
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-R Bar 
f i  Inertial 
Fig. 7 Proxipity operations apprnachcs. 
approach and braking technique c ~ u s c d  the gravity gradient 
stabilized LDEF to tumble. The one rtchniquc ha t  worked for 
approaches a b n g  nll threc Local Vertical L o c ~ l  Horizantal (JdvLrr) 
frame axes (V Bar, R Bw, H Bar) used orbirrr +i-X body axis RCS 
jets (Fig. 8) for braking. These jcts had s small component of tllWr 
along the -1-Z body axis. Some +R Bar appronches workcd with the 
Apollo approach and technique, duc to the nacural braking dfcct of 
orbital mechanics. 
t Approach Direciion 
Low z 
Plg. 8 Comparison of plumcs. 
Advanrages of the K Bar appronch wcrc consistently good 
lighting conditions for piloting and Y LVi,I-I motion that did not 
couple inro the N1,H X and Z axes. Unlike the -1.R Bar npproach, 
the H Bar approach did not have natural hrnking, but had nahtral 
acceleration, which nechsitatcd frequent thrusting ar ~c targct 
during approach. Out-of-plane motion still occurred lifter rclative 
translational mtes wcrc nutled. The H Bar approach was never 
baeelinod for operational use, due to safcty, sfation-keeping, 
propellant consumption and plume implngemcnt conccms. 
Due to the 1977 study, the orbirer flight control systcm was 
modified to provide a "Low 2" mode. This provided gome E S  
braking capabili~ while minimizing RCS plume impingement (Fig, 
8). Jets used for rhis mode had a thnlst component that was primarily 
along the X body rtuis. The serendipitous canting of thc aft X axis 
RCS jcts was not an original design requircnlcnt for proximity 
operntions.~ Upward firing KCS jcrs were inhibited in Low Z 
However. use of thc Low Z mode was ex~ensive in t c m  of 
propella~>t use. T1.w ability to perform an attitude hold with respect to 
the LVLH frnme wes aleo added to thc Shuttlc fligjit software. 
T Thc bnrkiog contribution providcd by Lhc siarfcd noscmountcd X exis KCS 
jets is ncga~cd by KCS firings to control pitcli, 
VIL On-Board Systems 
Relative Navigation Sensors 
Original Shuttle rendezvous navig~tion requiremcllts called for a 
radar range of 300 n.rn., provided rhnl tllc targer wi~s equipped with a 
transponder. Skin kacking (no tratwponder) of a irrrgct with n 1 
square lnerer cross section out to a ran&e of 10 n.m, would be 
kvnilablc a s  a contingency modc of o~e:ation.~~ 
Radar developmcnt c o s ~  Icd to examination of detknal of radar 
operaclonal cspability, uhich would have revultcd in Inally csrly 
rcndezvous missions not having radar. The cost of Ku band radnr 
dcvelopmenr .!so n?o!ive!=d the study cf s!:taiatiid? senson. "hi) 
optical rendezvous" was studicd, bur simulntians indicbtd that the 
probability of successful dud cocliipcic rcndczvous (Fig. 2) under 
diqxrscd conditions K.W less Ihan de~irable. Use of Shuttle cntry 
Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) units for rcndezvous war also 
studied, hut not pursued. This would httvc involved mounting s 
T A C m  nonsmittcr on hrger rpacccraft 
Thc decision to proceed with Ku radar devclopmcnt wns in pnrt 
motiv~tcd by concerns about tlle proposcd Skylab rcboosl mission. 
Cost ovcrmns prevented thc acquisition of target nanspondcrs and 
spare parts for the Shuttle radar, and rhe peysivc skin tracking modc 
of radnr operation was adopred (Fig 9), wlrich in turn lilnitd the 
range ofu>e radar. ' n ~ s  was n t c t o r  in the inability of thc Shudle to 
mcct rcndezvoua autonomy requiremcnts The Ku antenna aud 
clcctronics would also be usetl for wmrnlu~ic~tions through the 
Tracking and Dau Rclay Saellire (TDRS). 
I3 ~ackup. 1 
Range Bum Day! Star Radar COAS 
(nm) Night Tracker 
-- 
rig. 9 Operational use of Shuttie rendennus sentorfi f ~ r  a 
typical ISS mission. 
Opticd tracking would be provided by one of two skr backcrs, 
which were ~ l s o  to bc used for aligning the menial Meacutetnenr 
Units.25 The trackers had licld of vicw restrictions based ou Ednh 
litlib and bright object considcrstions (Sun, Moon), Availabiliry of  
optical measurements, which uscd rcflcctcd 5unlight to 
facilitate acquisition and Tracking, wrs seen es a mxjor chrllenye. 
Strobes, used on targets In previous progamr for opticnl tracking via 
tlic human cyc, wcrc judged to be il~con~pttible with thc Shuttlc star 
hackers. 
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As a bnck-up to the radttr and star trackers, a Crcul Opricsl 
Aiignment Sight (C0.4S) could bc used ro obtain angular 
measurements. The COAS would later see txtensive use during 
proximity opcrations (Fig. 10).?' 
Relalivc navigation sensor mmeuremenLs &om the radar, star 
tracker and C O M  are proccsscd i11 a Knlmnn filtcr thst builr upon Ihc 
.4pollo ~~crience. '~*' '  Original filter requircmcnts called for an 
optimal filtcr thst updated both the Shurtle rind targct state vectors, 
bur d ~ e  1976 on-board computer requirements sorub rcsulted in the 
filtuing of only onc statc vector, aK was done on ,kpoll0.7~ 
Bcgiming in the mid 1970s, there wcrc concerns about thc lack 
of a hnck-up r a g e  and range-rate mensuremd device for the Ku 
band rcndnvous radar, particularly during proximity operations or 
the proposed. Skylab re-boost mission. A numba of potential 
Fig. l , D  EVA crewman on the RMS attempts to 
capture INTELSAT (right). The COAS is on the 
left (STS-49,1992). 
off-the-shtlf solutions were examined. A laser rangefinder was 
flown on STS-4 1B and STS-41 C (1984), but limitations in rmge and 
accuracy limited their usefulnas. .4 parallax rnngcfindcr end a nigh 
vision system were also testcd on early tnissions, but pcrforma&e 
was not adtqate. COAS subtcndcd angle is available for range 
dctmination using charts at close range. 
During the Jare 1970s, use of the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) was examined, but not adopted due to cost and the irmnaturity 
of the technology.3 On-board processing of' TDRS Doppler 
measurcmcnts to reduce dependency on ground rniiar rracking wss 
.also studied, but not pursued due to on-bosrd computer Iimitntions. 
Maneuver Targeting 
Tbe ground-targeted phasc for orbirnl control begins aftcr orbit 
inscrtion. Rendezvous rnmcuvcrs arc computed by Mission Control 
using orbit derermination datti obtained by processing ground radar 
and TDRS Doppler neasurcmcnts. The lengh of this phasc vurics, 
avd !ypica)ly ksa scvcral days. Although a ground-targeted phase 
maneuvcr plan is dctm.ir?d befcce l~cnch, somc edjustrr.mts are 
required after launch due to Shuttle ascenl pcrformancc dispersions, 
or Shurtle or targct spacecraft systcnjs problems 
The on-board targctcd phasc begins once Shuttle senson (thc fmt 
is star tracker, Fig. 9) are ablc !o obtain rehbve meesurtments. 
Shuttle orbit sOjustn>ents are then computcd on-board, while Misstor. 
Con!.~al computations zre available a? a bnck-up, in thc cvcnt of m 
on-bonra ~ystcm anomaly. Unlikc the ~ound-tnrgctcd phasc, 
activitiec from the beg~ming of on-borud relative navigntion to the 
beginning o i  proximty opcrations (st a range of -2,000 feS) may 
change lrttlc from fl~ght o flight. 
The onginal(1972 through 1976) on-board targeting pttckngc wts 
called the Orbit Maneuver Processor (Otvf). The OMP conccpt w3s 
bascd 011 Apollo on-boaid a~ld gioui l  lids& LmgtLing. OMP wcs 
morc flcxible rhan its prcdecessorv and could sbpport differenr 
combinations of bums without reprogramming. It was dso capable 
of fa~gcting 311 orhitnl maneuvers from inscrtion through intcrccpt. 
In 1974, a requircmmt for Ihe Shuttle to conduct autonomous 
rrnldczvous (litlit or no support from Misbjon Conlrol) existed. 
Ashoaaur~ wert lo compute a nominal seriev of maneuvers and 
mccute them wichout Mission Control confirmation. For off-nomind 
sc~ar ios ,  the crew could compute and execute a rcndctvou.~ plan 
with inputs from checklists or Mirsion Control. The on-board 
cornpuler would not recomrncnd actions in rcsponse to off-nominal 
situations. Missio~l Coritrol was still to bc ablc to computc 
maneuvers, phicularly in the evcnt of off nominal scenuios. 
Howcvcr, lilniied on-board computer capacity made  he rcquiremenr 
difiicult to meet. A 1976 on-board targcting requirements sorub in 
responsc to compu.ter limitations movcd computation of bums irot 
supported by on-board relative navigation to Mission Control. 'niu 
move nlso reduced O W  implementation costs. 
In order to Iowa forward RCS propellaiit consumptjon, it ww 
bclicvcd that during proximity operations rhc orbiter should bc able to 
epproach a target from any direction (Fig. 7j, Tiis wouid providc 
maximum flexibility during mission planning, A proximity 
operations urgcting package bas& on the Clohcssy-Wiltshirt 
tq~xion: ioz.~!zted. H ~ w : ~ t i ,  !jiiiitiitkii~ In Shiiitie cirmp"ier 
capacity would oor permit inclusion of bo~h h c  proximiry operhtions 
targcting and the drrtldy scrubbed down OMP £or rendezvous 
targeting. Scrubbing the rcmsinilig OMP softwarc was one option, 
5111 studies iodic~ted t\sl :he Clohessy-Wiltshirc hgeting ptickage 
might not be ablc ro adcqunreiy ~upporr maneuvers with iongcr 
transfcr times, such ns TPI. The scrubbed down O W  was replaccd 
by a Lamben mrgeting option to support longcr transfcr times. ?hc 
original prc-suub OMP bdcnmc thc basis for the Shuttlc maneuver 
tnrgeting softwarc in Mission Control. 
On-board orbilcr state vectors uerd by Lambcrt and Clahcssy- 
Wiltshirt targering ace updatcd wirh mdor, star tmcka and COAS 
mrnsurcmcnts. h i ~ b e r t  hrgcting wes used for all rtndczvous 
~niscions, whilc thc Clollessy-Wiltshin option was never uscd in 
f l i g l~~"  
CrappIhg Hardware 
The RMS is an approximately 50 foot long, six degreeof- 
freedom arm cquippcd with six joints (shoulder yaw, shoulder pitch, 
elbow prtch. *st pitch, wrist yaw, sad wrist re!!). I! is locnted on 
thc port side of the payload bay,tand is capable of handling payloads 
up lo 65,000 pounds. Tlre RMS end cffcctor on the md of the nrm 
gapples s f i x h  installed on rhz prryioed. An displhy and 
control panel, rotational and translational hand contmllcrs, and 
associated television displays arc locatcd in the aft flight deck flight 
crcw station. A starboard a m  was nlso planned in the 1970s, b u ~  wwtrs 
ncva flown. In addition to deploymcnl and retrieval of snreliitcs and 
fice-flying scientific payloads, thc RMS is also used as an t~tenvion 
ladder for EVA crews (Fig. lo), for positioning modules during ISS 
ass-mbly and :qlmishcnt,  and for conducting orbiter md ISS 
inspections using telrvision arncras and other sensors. 
W L  Coelliptic Versus Stable Orbit Rendezvous 
a 
Tile Stnbie Crblt PraCIIe 
Although the dual coelliptic (Fig. 2) had been b~rclincd for 
tnission planning purposcs in 1973, doubts abour ik capability ro 
support Shuxle rendezvous missions pasistcd into thc carly 1980s. 
The ability to ohtein sufiicient on-board optio8l tracking using 
reflected sunlight, in the presence of EL* limb and cclcstial bright 
object constraints on rhe field of view was quectionnble. By 1978, 
forward RCS propellant deplerion due to rhe high relative approach 
velocity inherent wirh coelliptic wax a serious concern. 
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[n 1975, theoretical studics of  he stable orbit profile (first siudicd 
from 1962-1964, and. first flowrl on Gcmini llR-'3 were again 
pcrfbmcd. Stable orbit involved the initiation of rhe intercept from s 
station-keeping poinf. on the -V Bar, rathcr rhan froul a coclliptic 
orbit (Fig, 1). Stable orbit might sinlplify nigh1 design and 
opcrations for missions involving deploynent of a svtcllite, followed 
by retrieval of a second s6tcllit.c. Contingency r c t r j ~ v ~ l  O ~ Q  deploycd 
payloud might also be casitr to pctfbm wid1 stsblc orbi,t. A stable 
orbit profile would descnsitizc the mission timclinc Porn tqajectogf 
corxiderations. ,Stable orbir, long-rangc station-keeping (tcns of 
iniles) was preferable to close rang& station-keeping ( t a u  or. 
itundrdt sf feet), &a to :hc nced F>? cofit;.t:u%s crew mooitoriag 
and resulting propellant cxpcnditure. Howevcr, likc dual coelliptic, 
the availabilily of suficimt.t~ncking on a slable orbit profile for a 
navigationriby-pris5ii.e :=&a gns in qucstbg. 
Ry 1981, mission dcsign for the LDEF deployment and S o h  
f i x  repsir mission (lakr flown on STS-41C in 1984) was 
encountering diEculties. Mission planners began to ad~pr the mble 
orbit concepr to ovcrcomc propellant depletion, mission fimeline and 
on-bonrd tracking issucs with the dun1 coellipnc profile (Fig. 1 I). 
Rendezvous \\ 
Rendezvous \t 
From Below 
- $181 Tracker 
Fig. 11 A ptoposed stable orbit rendczvous profile 
(1982). 
It was suggcstcd that ground radar tracking nnc\ Missiol> Cohtrol 
compured bums could place the Shuttle st s point on tht -V BY, and 
at or within the rendewans radar iO n.nr raiige specificstitn. 
Station-kcsping at the stable orbit point would be performed until 
orbital noon, at whiclr point thc Shr~ttlc would initiate an intercept 
irnjecrory with an on-board targeted bum. Tile station-keeping and 
the timing of the hansfcr would rilso providc control over lighting in 
the manual piloting phrst. Station-kccping could also be extcndcd 
ill the event of Shuttle or tnrget systcms problems. ln the cvcnt of 8 
radar failure, optical tracking could bc pcrformtd. A station-kccping 
point of R 11.n1. was sclcctcd. This was insidc redu range, but far 
cnough away to avoid pofcnriRI pager size and brightness probians 
wit11 the Shurtle star trackers. closing rates dun'ng braking were an 
orda of mognirude lower than the dual coelliptic, which 1ov)qed 
prepellanr consunlption 
The Tuned Coelliptic Profile 
To addrrss concerns with the dusl coelliptic profile, coeiliptic 
advocates designcd an a l t m t e  called the "tuncd" coelliptic pig. 
12). All &y-of-rendezvous bums nfould be on-bonrd targctcd, with a 
masimum stw lracker rrackingrsngc of about 150 a.m. The codliptic 
A 8  was much lower than the second dual coellipric (2.5 VUSIIS 
10 n.m.). Ti~c Iowa AH ~ermitted radar acquisition of thc target 
before ?PI, and providul an overlap in rnd~r and snr tnckcr tracking 
for comparison purposes. Incrcasing the trsnsfcr mglc lowtred the 
renninal phasc rcletive velocity, which in turn lowered propellant 
consumytion during braking. Howcvcr, the lower AH also incrcascd 
the variability in the time at wliich the desired TPJ relative gcomctw 
(elevation angle) was scltieved (Fig. 1). The profile could bc tuned 
during thc mission to control slips in TPI time and trajectory 
dispersions. Adjusting the plamnent of carly phasing inaneuvers 
increased the numbcr of tracking periods prior to ~e coelliptic 
maneuver, and decrcascd TPI 'sensitivity ro bum dispersions. 
J V Bar 
- " 
- Star Tracker Pess 
MC1, 5 MC-2 
Radar may be 
obtained prior 
io TPI. 
Fig. 12 Tuntd coelliptic rendezvous with a A H  of 2.5 
nautical miles (1982). 
Selection of a New Baseline Profile 
A lenghy debate cnsucd bctween stabie arbit proponmts and 
ooelliptic supporters. Thc dzbue involved somc of the same 
personnel that had bccn inv~lvcd in the coelliptic vcrsus tangential 
versus first apogrt rendezvous debate during misdion planning for 
Gcmini VJ. in 1964.9 Coclliptic was a proven technique, and somc 
Mission Control p&sonnzl, HS well as some askonauk, were not in  
favor of adopting a. ncw profile. Mission planncrs believed stable 
orbit providd. several advantages over tuned coelliptic; lower 
propellant consumption, less complex ucw and Mission Control 
procedures, stable station-keeping points on rhe -V B u  in che event of 
a systems anomaly or chnngc in mission planning, md elimination of 
rbe need ro perform optics1 tracking with star trackca. l-Iowever, 
pilot-in.thc-Iccp simul~ciong indiczted thet n ~ ~ ~ b l c  shir prr?cedurcs 
were just as complex' as tuned coelliptic. SWMe orbit potentially 
offered more shaighrforward trajeoto~tltuign. for flights requiring 
rcn.cicwous from in ftoont or ~bove (Fig. i I j. Like stnblc orbi~, tuned 
cotllip~ic could bc dcsigned with Q delay option, but with higher 
propell;bnt consumption and irrcreased proccdurd complexity. 
hnalysis of thc stable orbit plnn revealed a numb& .of  
weaknesses, which .were corrected by changing the profile. Station- 
keeping on the -V Bar t t  the 8 nm. stable orbit point wns eliminated 
in favor of performing the inrercept mancuvu, called Transition 
Inidrition ('f:ir), whm thc 8-a.m. point on fie -V Ber w!is reoched. In- 
thc event of a systems anomaly,. an equal period "Eootbilll" trajectory 
could be initiated ~t Ti ("Ti delay") until it was, pmissiblc to 
continue tile rendczvous. 
Scvcral vadntioos of renninal phase were studied. In onc. Ti was 
targeted to place tllc Shualc several miles in eon1 oCrhe target on thc 
-1.V Bat, after which the Shunle would mow in along the +V Bw. In 
ailothcr, Ti urgcred the Shuttle for n poinr 5000 fcct n h a d  of rhe 
tsrgct ~ n d  1500 feet zbovc it. From there, thc Shuftle would fly a 
"glidrslope npprosch" (Fig. 11). which avoid& RCS firings that 
1 In rhc ncronyln "Ti," rbc "i" lor initiarion iu no1 cupitrili~ed 10 avoid 
co~~fusion with anotha r e n d c n ~ o ~  suonym wed in thc Shunlc PfO~1'3lu. 
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could impinge on thc tsrgct31 
hs analysis progressed, four Mid-coursc Correction (MC) burns 
were placed bcfwcen Ti and intercept. A planar change malleuver 
(null out-of-plwt velocity) was placcd si tht nohl  crossing 
following M C I .  To reduce the size of thc out-of-plane velocity null 
after M G l ,  on-board tracking wns exrended beforc Ti to include.one 
or two star hackcr passes, stating at n range of 40 n.m. This crented 
nn overlap ofgound and on-board rracking for cross chccking before 
commirting to an intercept ~ajectory. An additional on-board burn 
prior to Ti, NCC, war added to axurc that thc Ti point would be in 
the orbital plane of the target2'J0 
St&!€ arbit wns adapted as thc Shuttle bueline rendezvous plan 
in April o f  1983 (Fig. 13), during plnnning ffr tnission STS-41C. 
Fnctors influcncing the decision were the inability of thc Mission 
&ntrol softwarc (OW) to skppon rile tuned coclliptic u,id>ou~ 
modification, and that the stable orbit co~cept w x  promoted by he 
ISC orgai~ization responsible for trajectory design and mission 
piannilrg. In the cvcnt that a second rendezvous wit11 a targct WWRS 
required, stable orbit porentlnlly incurred lower pro~clleni 
erpa\dimre than t u n 4  coeiliptic. 
I V Bar (kfl.) 
.\ 
1'- 
40; - .Star ~mcker ''--------J- NCC 
one rev. lo TI 
Pig. 13 Stable orbit rendezvous (1983-1997). 
Shurtlc Pllghts (1.983-1998) 
First ProxirG@ Sper~:lons and KenCezvotis F!igkrs 
Aficr thc first flight of the Spacc Shuttle (STS-1) in April of 
1981, and successful demonstrstions of thc RMS oo subsequent 
flight., more personaei, eompuln resources and sitnuiator rimc 
bccame avnilnble for rendmous end proximi~y operations proocduro 
dcvelopmenr, rrajectory analysis and issue re~olut ion.~~ STS-7 (June 
1983) performed a proximity optrarions demonstrarion using the 
Shuttle Pallet Satcllitc ( S P A S - O ~ ) . ~ ~ ~ ' ~  Priinaq objcctivcs were ro 
dcmonstrete m d  evaluate proximity opwntioos techniques rquired 
for dcpioymml: separation, station-kcepinl final approach and IUlS 
c a p k c  of K freeflying payload No computer based msntvvei 
targrting or rtlutke navigation data using computer proccsscd rad~r  
measurements was availablc. Out-lhr-window cues and radar d m  
direct from the sensor were used. Results indicated thnL plume 
impingemalt math models u tac  ficc:!raTc, t h t  rendernous radar 
pc~iomcd better than cxpcctcd, piloline; ~ i n g  out-#E-window cues 
nnd radar data wau easily sccomplishcd, and that tlie proximity 
opmtions tnrks could bc a ~ m p l ~ s h c d  with propcllsnk consumpt~on 
falling within one sigma of prcdicrd vnlues. ll1e Low Z nnd L\XK 
attitudc hold tlighi control options were proven efrcctivc. 
The firs1 rmdezvous demonstration was planncd for SI'S-41B 
(Febiuary 19841, the renth Shuttle mi~sion Howevcr, rhc rendezvous 
was canccled ~ f t e r  die Intcgrttltd Rendezvous Target balloon burs1 
during dcploymeit &om the Shuttle payload bay. 
The Solar: Mnx repair mission (STS-41C, April 19b4, pig 6) was 
chc first "all up" use of thc Shuttle's inregrated rendezvous and 
proximity operations capabilitics. These included pre-fligl~t trajectory 
dcsign, launch window targeting ground urgering using radar-based 
orbit dctcrminution, deploynxxrt of a payload (LDEF, Fig. 5) during 
tl~c ground-Wgeted phase, onbosrc! rendcnous navigation with a 
navigationally passive target, onboard rendezvous targcting, and three 
body proximity operations i~\volving Challenger, Solar Max, end an 
sjtronaut flying rhe Manned Maneuvmng Unit. 
The first attempt to capture thc Solar Max wilh an astroaaut flying 
lhz MMU' failed, and a break-out mancuver was pexfonned to take 
Challenger safely away fmm S~lt i i  Mu. Emugh propellant marks 
was availablc to pcrform a second rendezvous bco d ~ y s  letcr, and -V 
Bar station-kccping 40 n.m, from Solar Max was performed until rhe 
second rcndczvous was initiated. A previously developed backup 
caprure proccdurc using the R M S  was uced to successfully gc~pplc 
Solar Max. 
The successful mccution of proximity operations on STS-7 and 
STS4lC and two rcndavouy profiles on STSIIC v~lidatcd work 
p e r f o n d  over ii dwscie io ei&ate pilotiag :eihiiiqi;cs iirid !:ajcct0dc6 
that ovcrcarnc Shuttle rysrems Iimitations, and allowcd thc Shuttle to 
mcct mission requirements different from those in the Gemini and 
Apollo progrsms. 
Chalfenges of SuSsrqurr;t Randazvour; and Proximity Operations 
Missions 
The succcss of CTS-7 and STS-41C did ~ o t  mcan that lntcr 
'.L.r-%- --- vriuulr rrri&~-~~-iS z%d proxiiiiity oper~dons iilinsions %:r in w,y 
way "routiue." The uniquc ehnraoteristics of &e various rendezvous 
targen, along with Shuttle system limitatio~~s, poscd technical 
challenges for cvcry rendea~ous mission, and neccssitatod mission 
uniquc enalysis and procedure development. Complexity of and 
varktion in procedures and techniqucs for Shunlc rendewous and 
proximity operations missions wtu far mearer rhan during Gcmini and 
Apollo. 
Tile paw of rcndczvous flights between STS-41C (Ap-1 1984) 
and t h ~  Chulleng~r accident (January 1986) had not been seen since 
thc Gcmini flights in 1965 and 1966,n-'5 The success of these 
compl~x miseions reflected the maturity of Shunle rendezvous and 
proximity operations plnlining and exccution. The loss of Challenger 
eliminatcd many poteotinl commercial missions involving rendezvous 
md proximity operations, such as Lcasectaft and the Industrial Spacc 
Facility. After the accident, rcndezvo~w miesiolls resumed in 1990. 
Missions executcd included retrievd and return to Earth of orbiting 
~h~elfiies, &~pl.plopeni ind re~ievsl of scjcntific paylonds, 6nd 
servicing of spactcrnft.3s 
Proximity operntions and ground L~tgeted phase k&ctory dcsign 
varicd from flight to flight, and was driven by many kctors that 
rcquirtd extensive analysis md contingency proccdurc (Misuion 
Control and on-board) dwelopmcnt, partic.ululprly if the flight involved 
more than one deploy/retricvc payload , Maneuver planning to 
prakidc adcqusk spncecraft scpamtien for ground radar backing, 
spacecraft to spnctcrafl co~~ununication l ink  ,md protection against 
, 
collision undet dispersed Irajecto~ conditions was pnrticularly 
challenging, By 1990, rhc availability of ground bascd processing of 
?DRS Dopplm measurements and near continuous TDRS 
conlmunic~ti ons covernge anhmced ofbit detecnination and mission 
activities. 
Rndar failure procedures for use during the on-board targctcd 
phase (for most flights, approximately 40 n.m. bchind the iarget 
rbrough manual tskeover st -2,000 f&t) were continudly inlproved to 
mminlize probabjlity of mission success. This ws demonsrratcd 
during thc STS-92 (2000) rendezvous with the l,SS, duc to a. radar 
GiIurc bcfore rhe day of rcnclezvou. ?hc rendezvous was ptrformed 
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wit11 stsr tracker data until Insex data bccamc xvailable scvcd 
thousand feet from the IS$. This wns the fixst "all optical? 
ro~~dezvous floufn'by NASA since   pol lo 7 in October of 1968. 
n e  ground-targtted phnce of two flights (STS-49 in 1992 and 
ST$-72 in 1996) used a colltrol box rcndcorous techniquc (Fig, 1 4)?6 
The target cxccuttd a series of nunavers after rhe Shutilc m.s 
launched to cnttr a "conuol box" in space a a designated timc. ThYs 
teclrnique reduced Shuttle propellant consumpdon. Once thc farget 
totered the b o ~  i! no longer msncu\tcrcd, A Shurtle planar change 
WPC) bum could also be performed to conlpensatc for target plang 
crror introduced by targct phasing maneuvers. 
INTELSAT Phases From Above , 
Satellite Servicing M:lssIons 
Satellite $servicing missions fiowln by tllc Shua t  (Table 3) 
requircd close coordination and planning betwccn rendezvous 
pcrsonntl, proximiry operations pcruorurel, Extm Vchicul~r Activity 
P A )  specialists, satellite manufacturers and sattllite operators. 
EVA prtpsration and execution occurred siniultancously with 
rendcnrous and proxiuu'ty operations tasks. The previously 
mcntioncd Solar .Max repair (STS-41C) was thc first servicing 
mission. 
After deploymatt of thc SWCOhf N-3 satcllitc by Discovery on 
STS-S 1.D (April 1985), a contingency rendezvous w conducted as 
the SYNCOM failed ro activate. DIE to the faiJure of rhe activation 
wmk-around (w improvised "flyswat.tci' on the "KMS to fiip n 
switch), Discovery rendervouscd agttin with SYNCOM on STS-511 
(August-Sep~ember. 1985): aftcr deploying three sat'cllitcs. Mis~ion 
plaming wiir hnher cornplicatcd by a circular deploy orbit for rhe 
thrcc sstcllites and subsequent rcndtmous with die SmCOM in an 
elliptical orbit. SYNCOM urns succcy~fully activated. Howcva, 
inadvcrtcnt plume impingement of b e  SYNCOM complicatcd r h ~  
retricva;, 
Retrieval end repair of fhc TNTELSAT-V! (dO3j communications 
stsellire by Endeavour on STS-49 (1992) was pcrhnps rhe mqst 
NHI dramatic servicing mission. Difficulties with the capcute bar 
Not to Scale K' SShuBo Phases From Below 
(n>an~pulatcd by an rsaonaut mounted on thc end of the M S ,  Fig. 
10) prwtntcd retrieval of rhe MTELSAT. ARer fi bieakoiit, 6 sreoiid 
Pig. 14 STS-49 planned relative matioil until control box rendcnrour was flown, with anothcr ftliied caprure attempt. During 
start time (1992). thc third rendezvous, an on-board Larnbcrt rergeting anomaly forced 
the crcw lo fiy a Ti-Delay profile for OYIC revoiution pig. 13). 3 i c  
Rendezvous or Proximity Operations Technique Demonstration 
Missions 
The previously mentioned STS-7 and STS-41C wcrc the f i1 -s~  
dcmonsantio~~s of the Shulclc's proximiry operarions ~ n d  rendezvous 
capabilities (Table 2). Thc Orbital Experiments Digitd Autopilot 
(OEX DAP) was an erperilnenhl proximity operii~ious autopilot 
tested on STS-SIG (1985) and STS-61B (19RS). The autopilot ww 
not incorporated into the Shuttle's cenified avjonics systm. STS-37 
tcstcd long-range station-kccping using star tracker nlexsurements 
while flying an otd-of-plwc profile using thc prc~ioukly deployed 
Gamma Kay Observatory as a target. This technique was proposed 
for flights with station-kccping distances conshzined by 
rendezvous was subsequentiy rcsumcd and Mission Coniroi uscd. 
navigation dab from the Shuttle computers to perfom1 targeting for 
subsequent maneuvers on thc ground. The capture was finnlty 
pcdormed with three EVA crcwmcn capturing the mTELSAT by 
hand. STS-49 set s ncw Shuttle record for the nurnbcr of rcndtmous 
pxofiles flown (throc) md the rotel amount to proximiry operations 
time (-B hours) in one mission. 
BcLween 1993 and 2002 four missions were flown to succcsvfully 
scrvice Lbe 13ubble Space ~ c l c s c o ~ t  (HSJ). 'ff~ese complcx servicing 
missions enhanced and cnnurrd rhe ability of HST to provide 
significant scientific data ~ n d  brearhteking photog~phy."' 
Tablc 2 Rendezvous or Proxlmlty Operations Demonsiratlon Missions 
Pligh~ Orbiter Year Profile Pdrger Commentr 
7 Challcngu 1963 Dcp)oy/Rctricvc SPAS-0 l Proximity opmtions only. 
41R Chnllcn~v 1964 DcploylRcndcixous IRT No rcndet\.oils duc to Wi'bulloon failurc. 
5 LG Ducovay 1965 Station-Kcrping none Station-kecping t a t  o f  proximiv opcrarions autopilot. 
61B Alhntis 1985 DrployIStauon-Keeping mdar refieclor Starion-kccping tcsl of proximity opuationsaulopilo~. 
37 ~tlnniis 1991 DcploylRcndcri~ous GRO GRO used as tergc~.for optical navigation ~cst. 
GRO = m m a  Kay Obsuua~oiy~ IRT = Intcgratcd Rendezvous Targct , SPAS = Shunlc Piiller Satcllile 
Table 3 Sntellite Srp idng  Missions 
- .  . .-. 
Fligllc Orbiter Yc;v Tmrr Commcnk 
41C Challenger 1984 Solar Max K&cued and repaircd aflcr second renduvous. 
5 Discovery . L98S SYNCOMW-3 Conringcncy rcndehous after dep)oylncnt and ncuvulion fnilurc. 
511 Discovery 1985 SkYCOM W-3 Rcndcwou B EVA plaru~ed h four monrhs. Eliiptical orbit. 
49 Zndcavour 1992 MTELSAT VI (F-3) Hybrid Control Box, rhrcc rcndcmous. 
G1 Endtavour 1993 Huhblc Servicing Mission 1 
82 Di~covrry L997 Hubblc Servicing Mission 2 
103 Discovuy 1999 Hubblr Suvicing Mission 3.4 
109 Columbia 2002 Hubhlc S c ~ c i n g  Mission 3B 
EVA = Extrd Vd~imLzl. Activity, TF!l'ELSAT'= Intcrnarional T r l ~ a m m ~ n i c o  Sal~llitr, SYNCOM = Synchronous 
Communicntion 
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Deploy and Retrieval 01 Scientlflc Payloads 
Sixteen rnissions wtre flown i~lvolving the dcploymtnt 'md 
rerrievnl of from one ro two science packages (Table 4). The eight 
rypes of dcployirdrics*.~ paylond.~ flown conccrncd astronomy, ,vace 
physics, stillospheric physics pig. IS), and e s i l c  dcfense rese~rc l~  
s ~ ~ ~ o z r . ~ ~ J ?  Parallcl cxccution of dep1oyi're~a.e profilcu, safe1)ire 
dcploymmts, 'EVAs, and multiple research rasks coordinatcd u6r.h 
mulriple ground ficilitics made these the most complex of thc Shuttle 
missions to plan and cxccuic. Dual shift, 24-hour crew opcrations on 
somc missions iurthrr compiicated planning and rcd-timc operations. 
During STS-S1F (1985) the Plasma Diagnostics Package (PDP) 
cxptrimenr expiareh ii~t phsma ciiviionm~o: trrziid C%o!!engc:: 
The mission required thc dcvclopmen~ of complex nominal and 
contingency (such as radar fail and delayed deploy) proocdurcs, and 
close coordinat.ion wi&. scienrific iilvestigiitors. I"ri;cijc proximity 
operntio~is burn targding was pet50med using the Shuttlc ,compukrls 
Lambed targethg a!gorjthm Pa &on-to-orbit due to thc shutdown 
of a mail, etlginc during ascent resulred in a lower orbital altitude, 
iorcing a redesign of on-board Lambtrt rtlrgeting data by Mission 
Coatrol. Tile challenging trajectory bm s u c c e s ~ ~ l l y  flown (Fig. 16), 
but ihe third orbit of Chrrllmger nbouc the PDP was cancclcd due to 
incrcwcd propellaor consumption during ascent. 
STS-39 (1991) involved a complcx, 38 hour profile to mppon 
obfiervntion of orbiter Orbit& Maneuvering Syscern (OMS] burns at 
points 1.2 and 5.4 n.m. behind the I.nfrared Background Signsturc 
Sut-uey (IBSS) spacccraff (Fig. 17n). Two Chemical Release 
Observation (CRO B and C) sub-satellites were deploycd during the 
' IBSS detachcd operdons, and a third (CRO A) was deploy4 &Act 
IBSS was rttricvcd. Missionplanning, dual shift crew opuations and 
observations by ground. stations were coordinated. Whilc Lhc 
mission was successful, the flown trajectory differed substantially 
fiom prc-mission pianning (Fig.17b) , due to complcxiticv involving 
orbit dctcrmintction, atmospheric variation, and unmodeled propulsive 
effects of the Shuttle and IBSS vchiclrs, 
On STS-77 (1996), in nddirion to Q deploylrehicvc of m 
astronomy payload with an iuflatable antenna (SPARTAN 207), three 
station-keeping and three re-rendemo~ts profilcs wcre flown wirh xhe 
Aerodynamically-Stabilized Magnetically-Domptd Satellite (PAM$ 
STU). The PAMS STU rendcmous profiles were speciiicslly 
'Fig. 15 CRISTA-SPAS prior'to retrieval with 
rhe W S  (STS-85,1997). 
V Bar (fl.) 
9- 
+lo00 
~ r b ~ t  1 . 
R Bar (ft.) - Orblt 2 
- Orblt 3 
- Final Transits, 
Reltleval 
Fig. 16 STS-51F In-plnnc relative motion with PDP (1985). 
Table 4 Deployment andRetrievral o f  Scientific I'nylonds 
. , 
F \ i ~ h t  Orbitu Year Target - Commcnk.. 
5 1 C Discover)' 1985 SPARTAN-101 Incorrect SPARTAN sttirudc ar rchievsl. 
SiF Challcngcr 1985 PDP On-boxrci argnal proximiry opcrntions. 
39 Dhovcry 1991 IBSS-SPAS LI Most cornpla dcploylrcfricve prohie flowo. 
56 niscovcry 1993 , SPARTAN-201-01 l a c r  mngc and range rate sensor rest. 
5 1 Discovcry 1993 ORFEUS-SPAS 1 Lang rangc, in-front and behind shtion-knping. 
60 ' I>iecovcry 1994 'WSF-1 WSF-I, problcrns prevcand deployment. 
64 l>i8covcry 1994 SPARTAN-201-02 First succwsful WI of Trajectory Conml Scnsar lam.  
66 Msnn's 19% CRISTA-SPAS I Foorball for data collection. +R Bar Mir approach conidor tcsL . 
63 Dhcqvery 1995 SPARTAN-204 Deploy day afia Mir w n h o u r .  Tmjectory designed to avoid Mir. , 
69 Endeavour 1995 SPARTAN-201-03 Incorrccr SPARTAN erripdc at retrievnl. 
WSF-2 Long range, in-front station-kccping. 
72 ~ndeevour  1.996 OAST-Flyer Gas vyiiing by an txpcrirncnr compliciid ground tracking. 
77 Endeavour 1996 SPARTAN-207-IAE Inflatable Anteona Expcrimcnt (IAE) 
P AMS-ST0 Three rendezvous and station-kecping (650 meters on -V 3ar) pcriodq. 
80 Colunibia 1996 OHEWS-SPAS 2 Relative GPS tcst for LSS ESA Automaled Transfer Vchiclc. 
WSF-3 Tang rangc, ia-fronl slation-keeping, 
85 Di.scovq 1997 CRISTA-SPAS 2 Tested ISS .i.V Bar cocidor approach using payload bay keel csmeca. 
87 Columbia 1997 SPARTAN-201-04 SPARTAN scdvacion fsilurc, LVh ~ ~ e v a l .  Guidsncc Scnsor tcsi 
95 Discovcry 1998 SPARTAN-201105 Vidco Guidance Scnsor tat. 
CRISTA = %ogmic Irilrared Spcctrotnacrs and Tdmcopcs for the Amospbaic, ESA =European Specc Agency, GPS = Global 
Posi~ioning Sysrwl, IRSS = hlfrsrrd H a c k p u n d  Sigualurc? Swcy, OAST = Ofiicr: of Aeronaurics and Spscc Tcchnolon , 
ORFELIS = Orbitin[: und Retieable Far and Extrunc Ulmviolcc Sptxuometer , PAMS-STU = P~qsivt: Auodynamic-M~pcticaliy 
Stdilizcd Sarcllitc Tcsr Uni< PDP = Plasma Diagnostics Prcbec, $!'ARTAN = Shutlle Pointed Auroaomow Tool For hstrooon~y. 
SPAS = ShutOe Pallet Sarellivr, WSF = Wake Shicld Qscili~y 
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Plg. 17 STS-39 lgSS Detached Activities (1991). 
designcd and flown to collect data for the experimcnL The PAMS 
STU wtts nor retricvcd. 
After deployment from Cohrrnbin on STS-E(7 (1997), the 
SPARTAN-201 free-flycr fail& to nctivate preventing 
accomp/ishment of science O ~ J N ~ ~ V P S  and forcing a "by hnnd" 
retrieval later in the mission by astronauts during on EVA The 
SPARTAN was successfUlly deployed and retricvcd rhe next yea on 
STS-35. Tllc Video Guidzncc Ser?sor (VGS), an expcnmentnl 
proximity opcratlons sensor,-was rested on both flights w i b  the 
SPARfAN. An improved version of VGS, cdled thc Advanced 
Video Guidmce Seiuor, was luter devclope-tl for the Bmonsnarion 
of Autonomous Rcndcmous Technology @hRT) and Orb~tal 
Express programs. 
An exatnplc of mission-spccific ~rajectory dcsign were the Wake 
Shleld Facility (WSF) flights (Fig. 18 and Table 4), The WSF 
shucNre creatcd m enlrnnced vsouum on thc downwind side of the 
vehicle 10 support thin film cpilaxial g~owlh md mnterials 
purificabon. 'Long-range station-kccping ulaz pufomdr &ad of the 
WSF, rather tlxan bchind, to avoid WSF contanination by Shulflt 
RCS firings and water dumps, There was also s rcquirment for thc 
payload bay to be visiblc tn the WSF for comunicutions purposes. 
Enendcd sradon-kccping with flic orbiter window6 aud radintors 
pointed opposite thc velacity vector (toward Ihe WSP7 was also 
desirable 10 minimize orbitd dcbris impacts on lhose surfaces, 
Keeping 11. MC2 
NC8-NC1 I 
- Star Tracker v 
Pig. IS STS-80 dcploy/retrieve profile for the Wnke Shield 
Facility (1996). 
Scvcral deploylrctncvt mtssious wcre used to ~vduate lelativc 
GPS technology for xPphcation to future rendezvous vehiclcs. 
Duriiig STS-69 (1995), fideuvaur czm'ed a Collins 3M receiver end 
fi>e 'Fa'@ S'nieid FaodriY a OsboiizelJe: ?ropu!:ian L~borator)~ 
TurboRogue receiver. On STS-80 (1996), Cuhmbia c~rried a TANS 
Quadrcx receiver and thc ORjXUS-SPAS I1 a Labc~l Twsor receivcr 
in suppori of the Europcan Space Agcncy (ESA) Automntbd Transfer 
Vehlclc (ATV) program. 
Rctrieval and Return t o  Earth oFa Satellite' 
Discovery 'on STS.51A (1 984) succ~~fu l ly  rehicvd the Palapa- 
B2 and Westar-VI communications sattllires only nine- months aftcr: 
Payload Assist Module failurcs pwetrred thcm from achieving their 
rervice orbits (Table 5). STS-51A dernonstrald the ability of the 
Shunle Program to rapidly rcspond to umv rcquire~nents involving 
target vehiclcs not designed to support Shuttlc hctivi~ies.~~ Phnning 
for the dual rcndenous mission wes iurthn oonlplicated by the 
deployment of two other cornmunicptions .siicellites prior ro the 
rendezvous and yeticil\g ph~yc, and Hte combinntion of proximity 
operations with free-flying (MMU) EVA crew capbring and 
maneuvcri~g rhe satcllitcr for gspplc using RMS. Detilcd. 
mission preparktion and real-time rc-plmning enablcd the readcmous 
with, reretriwel and temm to Earth of the satcl1ites within a tight 
propellanr budget. Both Ptilapn-B2 and Westar-VI maneuvered to 
meet downrange and plan;ir offset conditions bcforc the launch of 
Discovery. 
STS-32 (1990) successfully renieved LDEF (Fig. 5 ) ,  after it had 
spent nearly s i x  y e w  on-orbir. S#D@ orbitd decay due tr, the solar 
ma.ximum;(varia.tion in decay rate due to vnriablc solar flu, 
Tahle 5 Rctrlevat and Rcturn io Earth ofa SateJlitc 
Fliglrr Orbit& Ycar Targct Comments 
51A Discovwy 1984 Palaps-B2 Dot11 ~ilancuvued ro Inset downrnngc and plnn!ne~~consrraintr 
Westar-VI and rclricved by an ssmnnut flying rhc mQLJ. 
32 Calurnbia. 1990 LDEF Mot final approach due ro radar procedure issue. 
57 Endeavour ,1993 EW.CA (ESA) Solar array latch fiiilwe. corrrcld during EVA. 
72 Endwvoirr 1996 SFU (Japu) Hybrid control box Solar army rbtnction failure & jmison. 
LDEF = Long Duntion Expcsue Faciliry, E~XECA = Earopcan Rctrievahlc Cumer, EVA = Exbn Vchiculkr 
Ac$vit)< MMU = M i n c d  Manmering SFU = $paw Flyer Unit 
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Colvrnhiu launch dclliys and the SYNCOM 1%'-5 deploy two  d3ys 
before rlle rcndcmow conlplica.tcd mission planning. Orbir 
prediction of the LDEF had a high degree of uncertainty, and 
erpnimcc with Skylab in 1978 md 1979 heightened concerns ihaf. 
LDEF could reentcr the atmosphere beforc rchievnl. During Lhc 
rendcnrous, poor quality radar data at long range resulted in a. 
dispmcd trajectory, and a fnstcr final approach ha t  required 
additional braking. 
Thc European Kenievablc Ctimer (EI-IECA), deployed on Sl'S- 
46 (1992), wes retrieved on STS-57 (1993): EURECA completed sn 
orbit adjustment program in prsparation for thc rendemous sevcn 
days prior io thc launch 06fEnd~~woiir. A phist i ~ ~ c a t i n g  oxbi!: was 
used to establish periodic launch windows and ease mission planning. 
In thc mcnt of' an off-nominal Shuttle orbir insertion; &ns were 
dcvclopea for E'u?iECA to lower its orbib! z ~ ~ ~ d c  ro fscilirate 2 
rcndcsouk and retricv~l.~' 
STS-72 ( l enuu t  1996) renievcd thc Japlrnese Space Flycr Unit 
(SFU), which had bccn launched from rhe Tancgashima Space Center 
by an H-2 booster on Much 18, )995. Tile two SFU solor amys 
were jettisoned bcforc rchieval when sensors indicated improper 
latching after array rctracli~n. 
IX Mir and the Lnternatianal Space Station 
Docking of the Space Shunle with notional space dations was 
studied in thc early 1970s, as well as docking in support of spscc 
rescue motivated by the Apol)o/Soyuz T c s ~  Project. Much of lhc 
work donc to prepare the Shuttlc to support Space Station Freedom 
Docking Mnrdulnre 
The Androgynous Peripheral Docking Arucnbly-89 (HAS-89) 
unit (Fit 19) is a descrndent of thc APAS-75 unit jointly developed 
by the Sovict Union and the U.S. for rhe PgollolSoyuz Test Project. 
MAS-89 w originally intcndcd for w e  or1 a Soquz cbss vehicle 
snd the 311ran shutfle. Soyuz TM-16 (January-Fcbruaty 1993) 
dodced with one of the two Kristall Mir module ports equipped with 
the APAS-89. For thc U.S. Shuttlc, thc APAS-89 is mounted on the 
Orbirer Docking Syslcrn (ODS) in the psyload bay. APAS-89 was 
used for dockings to both Mir and ISS, A centerline camua mounted 
in the ODS with a bore sight through the ODS hatch window 
provides thc: ShLlbtle crew with s vicw of a docking targct mounred on 
h e  Mir and TSS hatches ii 
Fig. 19 APAS-89 on the Orbiter Docking System 
ia rhe psy1oe.d hzy. The RMS Is @I! the right. 
was appticd ro-rh'~ir and ISS missions(Tfcb1e; 6 and 7). 
Table 6 Space St~ut t le  Plights to  Mlr 
Flight Orbilcr Year Comrncnrs 
63 Dtscovcry 1995 +V Bar approach to 37 fcct No docking planned Lcnking RCS jct problem 
7 1 Atkmis 1995 Docked 10 Buran pon on Kristall Module. Crew cxchangc. 
74 Aflantis 1995 lnebilled Shuule Dxkiilg Modulc on Krktoll. 
76 Arhiir~s 1936 Resupply & U.S. c e w  dcl~very. 
79 Arlsnris 1996 Resupp)y B U.S. ctcw exchange. 
81 Atlantis 1997 Rcsupply & U.S. crew exchangc. 
64 Atlanti~ 1997 Rcsupply 8c U.S. crew acliangc. GPS & luscr test tor ESA A N .  
86 Adantis 1997 Rcsupply & U.S crew cxchsngc. GPS lest for ESA A N .  Piref ORDT Bight. 
89 Endcsvwr 1998 Ruupply & U.S. crew exchangc. 
91 Discovery 1998 Rcsupply & U.S crew return. 
ATV = Automatd TroarfezVehicic, ESA = Eurcptan Spnce Agency, GPS = Glob-d Bas;iionirig S-fsieiii 
ORBT = Optimird R-DK Tugeted Rendczvow 
Table 7 iSS Avrernbly atld K e p i & i s h r n e n t ~ ~ ~ s i o n s  
night Orbihr Year ' Commcnls 
~ ~~ -- -- - 
88 (2A) Endmvour ~ 1998 ' Cuptured Zarya with RMS, anached Unity Node with PMA 1 & 2. 
96 (2A.I.) Discovery 1999 Firsr dockill with ISS. JSS resupply and outtitting, 
.lo1 (2A.2n) Atlantis 2000 ISS raupply and outhning. 
106 (2A.2h) Atlantis 2000 BS resupply and butfrthg. 
92 (3A) Divcovery 2000 Rndar Bilure. 21 Truse, PMA 3,  Ku comm & CMGs installed. 
97 (4Aj - ondavour 2000 Ddivered P6 mss (=iik sdar orrays 8: ~diators). 
98 @A) Aaicnlis ZOO1 Ddivcred Dcsciny lab. 
102 (Sh.1). Discovery 2001 Tail fowarClappr~ch b1PM resupply. Crew cxchangc. 
100 (6h) Endcavour 2001 Tail forward approach. lnstsllcd robotic arm. MPLM resupply. 
104 (7A) Atlanlis 2001 Deli\iered Qucst Airlock (instdled with ISS robotic ann). 
105 (7A.l) Discovery 2001 MPLM resupply. Crew =change. 
108 (UF-1) Endeavour 2001 MPLM rrsupply. Crew mcllangc 
1 10 ( 8 ~ )  Atla~~tis 2002 Dclivcrcd SO truss end Mnbilc Trsnb-porrer. 
11 1 &TI?-2) Endcevour 2002 MPLM' rcuupply. Mobilc basc insbllntion. Crcw cxchmnge, 
112 (9A) Atlantis 2002 Delivered S l rmss, mdintors d CETA cart A. 
113 (1 1A) Endcavour 2002 Dclivcred P1 rmrie, mdiutocs 8? CETA cartfi. Crew occhangc. 
1 I4 (LF-I) Discovvy 2005 MPLMtcsupply. CMG replacment Finr RPM. 
A = Assembly, CMG = Control Momen: Gyo, CETA = Crnv and Equipment Translation Aid, . 
h4PLM = Multi-I'urpob-c L D ~ ~ s ~ ~ c s  Module,LF = Logistics Flight, PM.4 = Prmsurized Msu'ng Adaptn, 
RPM = R 'Oar Pirch fincuvcr, UF= Utilization Flight 
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New Sensor Devdopmrnt and New Cltallenge~ 
In 1987, srudics of: Shuttlc d.ocking with Space Station l:recdom 
indicakd rhat a bctter proximity operatiom sensor than the Ku Band 
radnr was necdcd. Development of ncw proximity opcrarions scnsors 
encountcrcd difficulty due to budget concerns, and rhe success 'of 
ShurtJc rcudezvous and proxill>ity opcrntio~~s to date. 
The first flight of li'md Xcld Lidar (HHL) on STS-49 (1992) snd 
the first successful flight of thc Trajectory Co~trol Scnsor (TCS) 
lidar on STS-64 (1994) providcd the precisc rmge and range rate 
measurements needed to mcct futurc Mir and ISS docking 
' conditions.43 Though. raw dtlta was adequate to mcct docking 
i24'.:.03-"+~ ,. TCS, SRC! legacy sensor dab (radar? closcd 
circuit tclcvision) wcrc processed in a Iqtop computer using a 
software package known as the Rendezvous oad Proximity 
0pc~:ions Pro&:em (F.J'OP). wOP providcd n relativc motion 
display and proximity operations piloting cucs not available in the 
legacy Shuttk avionics systcrn.43-d5 
The operational rnvdope of proximity operations sensors is 
illustrated in Fig. 20 for n ~ypical mission to the ISS. the cvcnt 
Sensor 
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Big. 20 Operational rlsc of Shuttle pcoxImlty oprraiio~ls 
sensors for a typical XSS mission. 
of a tndsr failure (such as on SSZ'S-92), TCS, IML, and COAS 
subtended angle are used carIitr in thc profile rhan on a r~ominal 
mission. A ranging ruler overlsy on xi afi cockpit C!osed Circ~tit 
Television (CCrv) monitor provides ranging during the lad 15 feet. 
While the rendnvous redsr is ussble with smltll targets down ro 
rangcs of between 80 to 100 fcct, thc size of Mir rind the ISS rcsulred 
in bcam wandering, which d e ~ a d e d  measurcmcnt quality, For IS$ 
missionz rcndnvous radar is generally not s e d  st tsnges less than 
1000 feet, and nfter this point the Ku band antenna is used i~istcad for 
vidco lrnnsmission over thc TDRS satcllitcs. TCS and 1IHL 
exhibited bettcr pcrformancc during proximity operations rha l  ?hc 
Ku radar. The availability OT TCS and mcasure*;>cnts alps 
csscntiai to ensure safe and N C C ~ S S ~ ~  approaches Lo MII aod the 
ISS. 
l c  was nlso recognized that Mir and ISS brightness nnd sizc issuek 
could complicstc or prwenr use of daytime star rrnckec mcasuremen1s 
for rclnrive navigahon after tl~c Ti maneuver, in ihe event of a rndar 
failure (Fig 9). Night scar tracker data was obkicled bchvttn the 
MC-I. and MC-3 bums during the SIS-64 rendczvouc with 
SP.&RThN. Analysis techniques veri-ficd with tlie collected flight 
data wcrc applied to d a l ~  collected during the STS-63, -71 and 74 
missions to Mir. Analysis of these misslons nldica(ed that the 18 
lights of varying intensity and character (f l~hing 3nd non-tl~shing) 
distributed scram Mir provided a suitable target for the Shuttle star 
wncker. Po* Ti contiagcncy night star trscktr mvigation procedures 
werc firrt flown on STS-79. A tracking light was sdded to the ISS 
Zvezde ("Star") S&cc iviodule to cniiblt contingnc' stsir trocking 
during orbital night for ISS ulissions. Night star tracker navigation 
was perfonnad durrng STS-92 due to rhe radar failure. 
Alrfiough Shutrie orbitcrs arc equipped with GPS receivers for use 
on-orbit and during en@, and the ISS is cquipped with GPS n$ well, 
GPS is not used for Shuff1c rendezvous or proxilnity operntions wirh 
the I S S . ~ ~ ~ ~ '  
Fiight Coneroi and Plume Chaliengea 
AIL rnivsiol~s to Mir and ISS rquircd extensive flight control and 
plune Impingement aniily~is of the various configurationfi during 
appmaih, A:-L. r u l ; ~ ~ ,  --L13bCIIIYIJI --.-hf., BDC! ~tp~%t i9n / ' -~ '  For exennlr 
r'- 
STS-88, a e  iirst ISS sssembly fligh:hf involved ths attnchment of the 
U.S. built Unity no& to ihe previously launched, Ruvsian 
mnnufacturcd Zarya modtilc, Unity wss docked to the ODS wing the 
XMS bdore the rendcmous wit4 ZRI~B. Shunlc fl~ght conrrol 
miysiu was ieijijrcd ia m;i;rt: :hiit execu&:: of rmde.ntous 
InBDCUVCr6 would not viobe rrmctural loadiilg constraints on Unity 
and thc ODs. Zaps wus Wer grapplcd with the RMS, nnd dodccd to 
Unity, At 42,000 pounds, Zarya was the lar~cur object ntcr 
manipubted with thc RMS. Analysis wlrr also pcrformrd to ensurc 
that ISS orbit raising with Shuttlc RCS jets coirld br succcssfi~lly 
pcrformedsl 
New Profile Development 
Thc rrabJe orbit rmdtzvous profile was cksigncd for maiuly 
inertial and +V Ber approaches (a transition to thc -R. Bar could bc 
pcrfonned upon tiriival at dlc 'rV Bar). A difficulty with thc  table 
orbir approach was the iuucascd umount of propellant rcquired for 
braking in Low Z mode (Fig. 8) 3nd grc~tcr sensitivity to plume 
impingement loads of Mir and ISS. Reducing pIun7e conccms (static, 
dynamic, thermnl, cooramination) wkq critical, pknicuiarly for soiar 
arrays. 
Planning far Mir and ISS rendezvous mif$ions prompted renewcd 
study of the 1-K Bar spproncl~ in 1993 (Fig. 7). Use of orbital 
mechanics to reduce the needed braking, ratlicr thnn using RCS jet 
firings, would lower plunle impingement md provide propellant 
savings. An additional bcncfit was that x .i.R Bar scpnrntion could 
ulso takc advantage of orbitnl mechanics, requiring fcwer jet iirings. 
Srudies indicated that the new approach could bc performed without 
changing on-board computer targeting constants for the stablc orbit 
profile. Thc u~nilahillty of laser sensors (TCS, HHL) provided range 
and range rate measurement redundancy which was not availablc 
when the +R Bar tppioach wes considered for t!ic Skylab reboost 
mission in the h e  19'70s. Aficr nrtcnsivc andysis, prooedure 
development, and cfforis to overcome programmatic resistance, the 
+R Bar approach ww npproved in April of 1994, and first flown on 
STS-66 in Novcmber of that, yew. +R Bar npproachcs were flown on 
rill missions to Mir.its) The Mir missious (Fig, 2 1) validated Shunle 
proximity operations nnd docking ai~alysis o;igilulally pc-rfornled for 
Space Suition Frccdoni. 
FROM :UNITED SPRCE RLLIRNCE 281 212 63 
I V Bar (feet) 
Pig. 21  Ailanfir docked to Mi r  during STS-71, as 
seen from Soyuz TM-21. 
Further analysis lcd rendezvous designers to investigate dianges 
to the rende;ruous profilc itsclf, befort tlie proximity operations 
phase, to m h e r  reduce propcllant consumption and inu-mse Shuttle 
payload capability. The stable orbit profile, like its' prcdtcessor tile 
coclliptic profile, was a "high mcrgy" profile designcd to suppon a 
terrninhl phasc i~crtial nppmac11 rind dircct intcrccpr Additional 
propellsnt and procedures were requircd for R Bar or V Bar sctivitics. 
A ~ c w  profile was designcd which was optimized for the .IR Bar 
~ p p r o ~ c h .  
Optimized R-Bsr Targered R e n d e ~ o u s  (ORET) differed from 
stable orbit in several ways (Fig. 22). ORBT wa< designcd Lo 
optimally sct up initin1 conditions for a low energy coast up fhc 
TI delay option V Bar (kfl.) 
'. L 
L 
m 
Max. 
' 
rn P w s Night (ISS) 
Fig. 22' Optimized R-Bnr ~ n r ~ e f e d  Rrndenlhs (1997-). 
+R Bar (Fig. 23, 24). By targeting tlre Ti, and first three mid-course 
rnuneuvers h r  rhc manu1 t a k ~ ~ e r  poinr RI 2,000 fccf ratha thnn for 
intcrccpt, manud phasc trajectory dispersione were rcduced hnd 
propcllant consumptian was cut, Thc Ti pviat for ORBT was below 
the V Bar so tbat the subsequent MC-4 AV vector wouId bc primarily 
in the +X body =is direction (Fig. S), saving proprlltint. Ihe  MC-4 
nlaneuvcr tar~cted the orbiter for s point 600 fcct below the rargd, on 
the i R  Bar. 0RBT did uot require as many +R Bar stabilization 
bums or ns many braking bum3 as were needed with the stable orbit 
profile. Thc first ORBT flight w a s  STS-86 lo Mil. (Scptcmbcr- 
Octobcr 1997). 
-R Bar 
Fig. 23 Approaches to ISS. 
Flg. 24 ISS viewed from Endeavour on the +R Bar  
during STS-1l3. 
Proximity Operations and Docking 
Final approach to rhe Mir (ti3 Bar) and 1SS (ti' Bar, +R Bar, or - 
R Bar, dcpcnding on the ISS configuration, Fig 23) involved flying B 
precise mngc and range rate profilc. An &degree, foliowcd by a 5- 
dcgrcc, approach corridor c c n t c d  on the Mir or ISS docking hatch 
target wnz flown (Fig. 25). Angular fly-outs wcre performed to 
achieve the rcquircd alignment for docking. Station-keeping points 
existed during the approach to allow dclay~ ro ensure proper lighhng, 
gain lime ro work sysbms issues or obtain visibility to ground 
c o m u n i c ~ t i o n  starions, if required. 
+R Bar  3. 
Fig. 25 Enterine ISS approach corridor at - 400 feeL 
Post-mdodcing fly-arounds were used l o  obtnin photography of 
h e  Mir and ISS, if sufficient propellant was availablc. 
Aficr h e  losfi of Columbia, a i*R Bar Pitch Maneuver at 4 0 0  fcd  
was added to the ISS spproach (Fig 23). T h e  maneuver pcrmits 
photogmphy of the Shuttle thermal prokction .surfacek by the ISS 
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crew.4.'J4 A neut requircmcn~ to Shuttle thcnllsl prorectiol~ Tnle i Z  nxis, slso csll the .(-RBm =is, is defined ns: 
repair at the ISS also 'drove extcnsivc proximiv opcr~Gons ar~alysis 
md procedure dcvelopme~~t. Thc Shuttle R M S  grapples a fixture on iz = -unit[rT] 
the ISS m d t h e  Shuttle is rotsf& to aq nppropria.tc positio~l rebt.ivc to 
tllc ISS for repair. ISS sttirude was dcilnzd rhot urould. facilirste a Thc +Y axis, also callcd the -13' Bar axis, is definzd as: 
safc sepaxation (no undesirable contact with or pluming of ISS and 
Soyuz structure) a d  re-docking in the event a % I S  or orher kilurc l y  = -unit[rT x vT] 
resulted in a contingency separatton from the ISS.ss 
The +X =is, also cltlled rhe +V Bar axis, is defined as: 
Launch Windows and .Mission Planning 
M:ission planning for fSS assembly md replenishnlcnt missiorls is i, = unit[(rr x Y ~ )  x rr] 
complm process, wid1 many factors slldl as ISS- logistics, ISS 
hardware maintenance, 1% oibit maintennoce, Shuttit &cent. abort, In the LvC frxlnc, the vBar is  c ~ l i n c a r ,  rnc'ner tinan rcctiiincar. 
rcndnvous and proximity operations considerations, and visits of 
0 t h ~  vehicles ( ~ o y u z ,  proB&, ATV, Hm to the ISS that must be 
c ~ n s i d e r e b ' ~ . ~ ~  
After thc 103s of Cohrmbia, a rcquirrmenr to perform photography 
of thc Shuttle during a s c a t  (using ground b ~ s c d  cameras and 
camerw mounted an NASA WB-57F sircraft flying at -60,000 kct) 
and External Tank (ET) photography afta scpar~tion led to daylight 
launch and acceptabie E'i' photography i-eqtiiremeiltu. Only :he ISS 
planar launch windows which met rhese lighting condirions werc 
acceptable. This severely rcstsic~ed lnunch dates available for ISS 
missions, creniing I~.unch s c ~ o n s . ' ~  
In coordination with h e  Rutsinns, contingmoy pkr?$ exist for thc 
ISS m lower its orbir in the event Shuttlc tiscent propu!sion problems 
(such as an ewly main mginc shuldom) 2imir thc sbiliiy of !he 
+Y or -n eer 
Fig. 26 Local Verfical Curvilinear reference frame. 
shuttic ;o fly the planned rcndczvos profile.".59 
X. Conclusions Acknowledgmcnfs 
Shuttle rendezvous and prbximity operations tshnique 
developrncnt has been able to rcspond to new program rcquirtmmts, 
but rhe dcvclopmcnr process was not alwny~ straiglitfonvud. The 
success of th.e Spece Sliuttlc in fuulfiliing new, c l ~ s l l ~ ~ g i n g  a d
unforcsccn requirements h ~ s  bccn due m ~stcnsivt  analysis 
conducred by intcgratcd, interdisciplinary terms; ciad continuous 
development .of new nominal and contingency procedures for a 
vehiclc and. ground support systcrn that possesses a high degtee of 
flcxibiliv. However, thc succesg of Shuttlc rcndczvouc and 
proximity operations has come at the expnse  of som* of the original 
objectives and gods o i  the Shuttk Progmm. Thefie il~cludcd 
simplifieG ~ n d  staiidsrdizcd riiis~io~: piaping end training, !owcr 
number of nlission suppoe pasonnel, high flight mtes, elimination of -' 
cxtcnvive flight-to-flight ~nalysis, no co~nputatib of flight specific 
trajectory data, and no gcncretiun of cusromizcd onbowd Ll~arts for 
each mission. Successful tldnptation ofproven rcndenous pdnciplcs 
meet new and cmcrging operational and progrmmntic constraints - 
was in part due to the cony-over of cxpcritnced personnel from the 
shorta duration Gemini and Apollo prognms. Thcsc pzrsonnel 
possecsed extensive cxpcricnce in the developmcnl and at?alysis of 
vchicle and subsystem pcrfomance .ipecifications, requiren~enis 2nd 
. optratioas concepts. 
Appendix - Keka tive Frame 
Relative motion i s  olieo depicted in a Looal Vertical Locd 
I-Iorizontal (r,VT;H) or Local Verricai Curvilinear (LVC) fiamc p ig ,  
26).60 
The target position and vc!ocify vectors are uscd to define rlle 
axcs. Nomenclame for thc axcs foUows rhe convcntion used wirhin 
tire Shuttlc Program. 
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